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Parents who have disciplined their teenagers have been known
to articulate an order similar to the following: "You are grounded
for one week from all activities, without exception." Within
moments, the disciplined youth might propose that the terms of
punishment be "loosely interpreted." "Grounded," the youth
would argue, really means grounded within a two-mile radius of
the family home; "one week" does not include the weekend; and
certain activities may be exempt from the punishment.
While the reaction may not have been quite so swift, the
language of California Penal Code section 667, which enhances a
serious felon's prison term by five years for each prior serious
felony conviction, has been similarly challenged.' Since the
enactment of section 667 in 1982, defense attorneys have urged
that the electorate's specification that prior felony convictions shall
* Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District; B.A. 1972,
California State University, Fresno; J.D. 1975, University of Santa Clara.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West Supp. 1992). Section 667 provides in pertinent part:
In compliance with subdivision (b) of section 1385, any person convicted of a serious
felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of an offense
committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony,
shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a
five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried
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be used "without limitation" for purposes of sentence
enhancements2 should not be interpreted literally. Not surprisingly,
judicial interpretation of the "without limitation" language has
ranged from being virtually ignored3 to significantly impacting
enhancements.4 More recently, the depublication of a California
Court of Appeal opinion leaves trial courts with some crucial
questions regarding the scope of the "without limitation" clause
not yet resolved by precedential authority.'
The discussion that follows is not intended to be an exhaustive
analysis of the 1982 habitual crime statute which resulted from the
passage of Proposition 8. Rather, this Article attempts to
demonstrate how a popular mandate, ostensibly forthright, can
undergo years of controversy among the courts and engender
ultimate intervention by the state legislature.
I. THE CASES
Immediately after enactment of Proposition 8, criminal
defendants began asking sentencing courts to exercise discretion
pursuant to Penal Code section 13856 to dismiss valid five-year
prior felony enhancement allegations. In response, prosecutors
argued that there was no discretion to be exercised by the court in
2. Victims* Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8, 1982) (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 12,28; CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1988), §§ 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043
(West Supp. 1992); CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West 1984)). See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 28(0.
3. See, e.g., People v. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d 227, 230-31, 707 P.2d 833, 834-35, 219 Cal. Rptr.
460, 462 (1985) (holding that a trial court may strike a sentence enhancement irrespective of the
.. without limitation" clause).
4. See, e.g., People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 432-40, 787 P.2d 1012, 1014-20, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 607-13 (1990) (strictly applying the "without limitation" clause).
5. See People v. Vallejo-Lugo, 228 Cal. App. 3d 66,278 Cal. Rptr. 713, (1991) (depublislied
May 16, 1991). See also CAL. RULE OF COURT 979(e) (West 1991) (a depublication order is not a
statement of correctness nor inferentially a statement of wrongness of a result in a case).
6. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 938, sec. 7, at 2968 (amended by 1986 Cal. Stat. ch, 85, sec. 2, at
211). Prior to its amendment in 1986, section 1385 provided in pertinent part:
The judge or magistrate may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the
prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action dismissed. The reason
of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.
kia
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such a matter since, pursuant to section 28(f), the prior convictions
were to be used without limitation.7 Judges learned that the adage,
"discretion is the better part of valor," had taken on new meaning.
Indeed, such judges were faced with determining the more prudent
approach: To exercise discretion under section 1385 and dismiss
the enhancement, or to construe the "without limitation" language
to mean that the enhancement was mandatory.
The appropriate interpretation of section 28(f) was resolved by
the Supreme Court of California in People v. Fritz.8 Justice Kaus,
writing for the majority of the court, concluded that "neither
section 667 nor article I, section 28(f), can be construed to abrogate
a trial court's well-established statutory authority to strike a prior
conviction." 9
Both the trial court and the appellate court in Fritz held that the
section 667 enhancement is mandatory rather than discretionary.'"
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the authority of a trial
court to dismiss an action in the interest of justice includes the
power to strike an admitted or proved prior conviction sentencing
enhancement.1 ' The court reasoned that since neither the
Proposition 8 statutes nor the ballot analysis and arguments even
suggested an intent to eliminate a trial court's discretionary power
under section 1385, that power remained legitimate and valid.'2
Justice Grodin concurred with the majority, but expressed some
distress over the majority's discounting of the language used in
Proposition 8 that prior felony convictions shall be used "without
limitation."' 3 Justice Grodin believed the meaning of this phrase
should be afforded greater significance. 14 At a minimum, he
opined, the clause means that no constitutional barrier prevents the
use of prior felony convictions in sentencing enhancements. 5
7. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28(f) (emphasis added).
8. 40 Cal. 3d 227, 707 P.2d 833, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1985).
9. Id. at 231, 707 P.2d at 835, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
10. Id at 229, 707 P.2d at 834, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
11. Id at 231, 707 P.2d at 835, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
12. Id at 230-31, 707 P.2d at 834-35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
13. Id at 231, 707 P.2d at 835, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63 (Grodin, J., concurring).
14. Id at 233, 707 P.2d at 836, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64 (Grodin, 1, concurring).
15. Id (Grodin, J., concurring).
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Justice Lucas' disagreement with the majority of the Fritz court
was much stronger. Joined in his dissent by Justice Mosk, Justice
Lucas interpreted the majority opinion as "[thwarting] the obvious
intent of the framers of, and voters for, Proposition 8."' 16
After the Fritz decision, lower appellate courts attempted to
clarify the duty of a sentencing court in applying sections 667 and
1385.17 However, with little delay, the California Legislature
intervened and amended sections 667 and 1385 to eliminate a
sentencing court's discretionary power to dismiss enhancements
based upon prior convictions, thus abrogating People v. Fritz.8
The Supreme Court of California once again examined the
"without limitation" language of Proposition 8 in People v.
Jackso 19 In that case, the court considered whether an aggregate
sentence term, which included a section 667 enhancement, may
permissibly exceed double the base term.2" The defendant in
Jackson argued that the term limitation provided for in Penal Code
section 1170 could be exceeded only for expressly specified
statutory exceptions, none of which were applicable in this case.
21
In response, the Attorney General argued that enhancements for
serious felonies were excluded from the limitations of section 1170
16. ML at 233, 707 P.2d at 837, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 187 Cal. App. 3d 499,511-12,231 Cal. Rptr. 889, 896-97
(1986) (holding that discretion to strike sentence enhancements should be exercised even in the
absence of a section 1385 motion); People v. Courtney, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1006-07, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 328,329 (1985) (holding that a sentencing court may impose an enhancement without expressly
articulating that it exercised a discretionary power).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1385 (West Supp. 1992). The legislature declared: "It is the
intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holding in People v. Friz... to restrict the authority of the
trial court to strike prior convictions of serious felonies when imposing an enhancement under
[section 667]." 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 85, sec. 3, at 211-12.
19. 37 Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985).
20. Id. at 831-39, 694 P.2d at 738-44, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 625-31. At the time the Jackson case
was decided, Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (g), provided in pertinent part:
The term of imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial
court as the base term... unless the defendant stands convicted of a "violent felony"
as defined in subdivision (c) of section 667.5, or a consecutive sentence is being imposed
pursuant to subdivision (c) of. this section, or an enhancement is imposed pursuant to
section 12022, 12022.5, 12022.6, or 12022.7 or the defendant stands convicted of felony
escape.
1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1551, sec. 1.5, at 6048. Compare a. with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West
Supp. 1992).
21. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d at 837, 694 P.2d at 742, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
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because such enhancements are to be applied "without
limitation." 22 Additionally, the Attorney General argued that
section 667 necessarily contemplates an enhancement greater than
the base term because serious felonies such as burglary usually
have a base term of less than five years.23
In light of these arguments, the Supreme Court of California
held that an aggregate sentence, including a section 667
enhancement, may exceed double the base term.24 Justice
Broussard, writing for the majority, stated that the meaning of the
"without limitation" provision is uncertain, but agreed that section
667 was intended to impose an enhancement unlimited by the
double base term rule.' Section 667 was thus exempted from the
provisions of section 1170. 1(g).
26
Another statutory sentencing provision that has been subject to
judicial scrutiny in light of the "without limitation" language of
Proposition 8 is the one-year enhancement provision provided in
section 667.5(b).' For instance, in People v. Maki the trial
court imposed three one-year sentence enhancements for three prior
prison terms that the defendant had served as a result of three prior
convictions.29 The enhancements were imposed even though they
violated the five-year "washout" provision of section 667.5(b).3"
22. Id, 694 P.2d at 742-43, 210 Cal. Rptr. 629-30. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b).
23. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d at 837, 694 P.2d at 743, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
24. I d at 839, 694 P.2d at 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
25. Id at 838, 694 P.2d at 743, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
26. Id at 839, 694 P.2d at 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 631. In 1987, the California Legislature
amended section 1170.1, subdivision (g), to expressly except section 667 from the double base term
limitation. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1423, sec. 3.7, at 5272-75 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1).
Compare itd with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1992).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (West Supp. 1992). Section 667.5(b) provides in pertinent
part:
[The court shall impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term served for
any felony; provided that additional term shall be imposed under this subdivision for any
prison term served prior to a period of five years in which the defendant remained free
of both prison custody and the commission of an offense which results in a felony
conviction.
Id
28. 161 Cal. App. 3d 697, 207 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1984), disapproved by People v. Prather, 50
Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d 1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990).
29. Id. at 699, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
30. Id.
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The court of appeal in Maki struck the enhancements, reasoning
that the reference in Proposition 8 to "prior conviction" is
distinguishable from the reference to "separate prison term" in
section 667.5(b).31 As a result, the use of enhancements based
upon prior prison terms remained subject to the five year
"washout" limitation.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of California considered the related
issue of whether Proposition 8 impacted section 667.5(b). In People
v. Prather,32 Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority of the
court, held that the "without limitation" language in Proposition
8 applied to section 667.5(b) sentencing enhancements. 3 The
court reasoned that Proposition 8 superseded the double-base-term
limitation provided in section 1170.1(g).34
The Prather majority acknowledged that the "without
limitation" language is difficult to interpret and should not be
taken to its literal extreme.35 The court noted that the language
does not divest the legislature of "its basic power to define
particular enhancements and determine the appropriate period by
which a sentence may be increased as a result thereof."
3 6
However, the court indicated that this power is not broad enough
to permit the legislature to establish "general caps or ceilings on
overall length of sentence," because such caps are not sufficiently
conditional or definitional as, for example, is the permissible
limitation to "serious felonies" provided in section 1170.37
The supreme court in Prather concluded that section 667.5(b)
merely provides a special sentence enhancement for the subset of
"prior felony convictions" that were deemed serious enough by
earlier sentencing courts to warrant imprisonment." Accordingly,
the court held that the language in section 28(f) concerning the use
31. Id. at 700, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
32. 50 Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d 1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990).
33. Id at 437, 787 P.2d at 1017-18, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
34. Id at 440, 787 P.2d at 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
35. Id at 437, 787 P.2d at 1017-18, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
36, Id at 438, 787 P.2d at 1018, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (emphasis in original).
37. l d at 438-39, 787 P.2d at 1019, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
38. Id at 440, 787 P.2d at 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
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of prior felony convictions for sentence enhancement purposes
includes the lesser category of enhancements based upon prior
felony convictions for which imprisonment was imposed.39
The recently depublished case of People v. Vallejo-Lugo
40
raised two issues dealing with the effects of Proposition 8: (1)
Whether trial courts continue to have the power to stay
enhancements; and (2) whether Fritz can still be utilized by trial
courts to strike or stay a one-year enhancement.41 The trial court
in Vallejo-Lugo had imposed three separate five-year enhancements
for section 667 prior convictions, but pursuant to section 654,42
stayed execution of sentence for two one-year enhancements for
section 667.5(b) prison priors. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the trial court had discretion to impose enhancements with lesser
terms and stay those with greater terms.4' However, the appellate
court concluded that section 28(f) precludes trial court discretion
from staying section 667 enhancements under the guise of section
654.4 The court reasoned that section 28(f) provides that prior
felony convictions shall be used "without limitation" for purposes
of sentence enhancement, and staying an enhancement pursuant to
section 654 amounts to an unauthorized limitation.45 Thus,
applying the reasoning of Prather, the court held that section 654
was inapplicable to the imposition of sentence enhancements under
both sections 667 and 667.5(b) because it limited punishment,
rather than defined offenses or enhancements.46
39. let
40. 228 Cal. App. 3d 66, 278 Cal. Rptr 713 (1991) (depublished May 16, 1991). See CAL
RuLE OF CouRT 979(e) (West 1991) (a depublication order is not a statement of correctness nor
inferentially a statement of wrongness of a result in a case).
41. Vallejo-Lugo, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988). Section 654 provides in pertinent part: "An act or
omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be
punished under either of such provisions but in no case can it be punished under more than one." 1,
In Vallejo-Lugo, the first prior prison term enhancement was based upon the same offense supporting
the first and second prior serious felony enhancements, and the second prior prison term was based
on the same offense supporting the third prior conviction enhancement. Vallejo-Lugo, 278 Cal. Rptr.
at 714.
43. Vallejo-Lugo, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
44. Id. at 717.
45. Id
46. 1& at 718.
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The more controversial issue in Vallejo-Lugo was whether the
enhancement terms for the two section 667.5(b) priors must be
reinstated.47 Having concluded that the terms could not be stayed,
the appellate court considered whether the trial court had the
discretionary power to dismiss or strike the enhancements pursuant
to section 1385."s The court held in the affirmative, reasoning that
because the supreme court in People v. Fritz articulated a general
statement that section 1385 power survived the enactment of
Proposition 8, and because the 1986 amendments to sections 1385
and 667 eliminated the power of the trial court to strike section 667
enhancements, the power to strike section 667.5(b) enhancements
survived in light of Proposition 8."
Depublication of the Vallejo-Lugo opinion, at the very least,
casts doubt upon the appellate court's limited resurrection of Fritz.
If the state legislature decides to intervene and specify that the
discretionary power of trial courts to strike .section 667.5(b)
enhancements is also abrogated, there will be no remaining doubt
as to the demise of Fritz
III. A JURIST'S PERSPECTIVE
Absent legislative intervention or a definitive ruling from the
California Supreme Court in a case addressing the issue of
sentencing enhancements, a trial judge confronted with the issues
presented in Vallejo-Lugo is likely to experience a deep sense of
loneliness. The trial judge knows that since it was depublished,
Vallejo-Lugo may not be cited as a binding precedent.5" To whom
or to what should the trial judge turn for guidance? Should the
judge opt to be bold or circumspect?
Those of us who have served at the trial level understand that
seeking shelter from appellate reversal by opting for the seemingly
cautious approach can, at times, render us no less vulnerable to the
47. Id.
48. Id at 718-19.
49. Id. at 719.
50. See CAL. RULE OF CoURT 979(e) (West 1991) (a depublication order is not a statement
of correctness nor inferentially a statement of wrongness of a result in a case).
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storm. To a judge, the history of Proposition 8, as discussed above,
demonstrates how difficult it is to discern what is, or is not, a safe
approach when dealing with issues relating to sentence
enhancements. A judge willing to eschew safety may be tempted
by a defense attorney's urging of the court to exercise its power
under a statute which has not yet been subjected to Proposition 8
scrutiny. For example, a judge may apply Penal Code section
1170.1(h) which provides for the striking of a sentence
enhancement if the court determines the existence of "mitigating
circumstances." 5' Section 1170.1(h) has never been subjected to
appellate scrutiny to determine its validity in light of the "without
limitation" clause of Proposition 8, yet, a trial judge willing to
make regular use of this source of power would certainly be
inviting appellate intervention. Trial judges facing the types of
issues presented in Vallejo-Lugo are thus left only to make
educated guesses of what circumstances, if any, allow strildng or
staying section 667.5(b) enhancements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A certain irony emerges from this brief study. The apparent
effort of the drafters of Proposition 8 to be blunt and leave nothing
subject to exception has instead incited a ten-year trail of
controversy not yet completely resolved. Although one objective in
drafting this initiative may have been to avoid intricacies that tend
to be beyond the ken of the typical voter, the elements of
sentencing law, even if expressed in their simplest form, cannot be
understood by the public at large.5"
While the intent of the electorate to toughen sentences of repeat
offenders arose, at least in part, from a belief that the legislature
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(h) (West Supp. 1992) (providing for striking of a sentence
enhancement if the court "determines that there are circumstances in mitigation of the additional
punishment and states on the record its reasons for strildng the additional punishment").
52. See generally, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality
of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. Cal. L Rev. 733 (1988).
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had failed to address the issue,5" it is the legislature which is
charged with defining applicable crimes. Although caps on lengths
of sentences may no longer serve as limitations on section 667 and
sections 667.5(b) sentence enhancements, the categories of present
and prior crimes to which Proposition 8 applies remain subject to
definition.
"Without limitation" as used in Proposition 8 is limited by
statutory powers exercised by the courts and clarifying definitions
expressed by the Legislature. Initiative drafters should learn from
this example and take caution in using seemingly absolute terms.
As the well-worn maxim appropriately states, "Never say never."
1060
53. See People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 435-36 n.7, 787 P.2d 1012, 1016 n.7, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 609 n.7 (1990) (discussing the public's dissatisfaction with the legislature's failure to
sufficiently punish dangerous felons).
